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2Abstract: 
 
This paper analyzes voting inequality created by the Electoral College.  It focuses on the concept of “voting 
power,” the ability of an individual to influence the outcome of an election, within the political context of the 
controversial 2000 and 2004 elections and resulting attempts to abolish the Electoral College.  Unlike the 
bulk of scholarship which has used a priori measures of voting power, I develop empirical measures of voting 
power.  These measures indicate that those individuals most advantaged by the Electoral College are those 
living in the large states tracking closely with the national popular vote.   
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3Foreward 
 
At the beginning of high school, I became fascinated by “horse race”-type coverage 
of political races, watching candidates jockey for those so-called “swing” voters who would 
make the difference come Election Day. The Presidential election, in that sense, was the 
highlight of the political season—instead of one poll tracking two candidates in one state or 
congressional district, I was treated to a myriad of polls tracking Al Gore and George W. 
Bush in over a dozen “swing states”. And, since these were swing states, the polls showed a 
close race in all of them.  
The scenarios were endless: “If Gore wins in Iowa, New Mexico, Ohio….then he 
has to win either Tennessee or Florida,” or “If Gore can win Ohio, then all he has to pick up 
is Florida,” or any one of a number of options. It was a pundit’s dream; commentators 
spoke about the varying likelihoods of these different scenarios, using colorful, red and blue 
maps to demonstrate their arguments.  
I think that it was these quirks in the Electoral College which initially grabbed my 
attention. It certainly was a lot more interesting to follow than a national poll that would 
show Bush up two points. What interesting conclusions can be drawn from that figure? 
Gore needs more votes? That’s pretty obvious. With the Electoral College, on the other 
hand, Gore could strategically choose states to target where he needed to make up ground, 
shooting for that critical 270 electoral vote threshold.  
And yet, there was something disconcerting about the process. Why did my parents 
in Iowa deserve so much more attention than my grandparents in Utah or my uncle in 
Idaho?  Having been born and raised in Iowa, I may think Iowans are, on the whole, a better 
lot than those in other states—but I doubt this opinion is shared throughout the country. 
4And yet, for a few months at least, we were treated as if we were substantially more 
important.  
This unease about the seeming inequality produced by the Electoral College grew 
during the 2004 Presidential campaign. My grandparents who live in Salt Lake City wanted to 
campaign for John Kerry. The problem was that they didn’t know what to do—they knew 
Bush was going to win Utah by a landslide. They felt that their votes, the votes of their 
friends, and the votes of those they spoke to in their community were irrelevant in deciding 
who would be President. And they were, for all practical purposes, right.  
My personal situation contrasted greatly with their predicament. Instead of having no 
state in which I could make a difference, I had the opportunity to choose between voting in 
either of two “swing states”: Iowa or Minnesota. As a student, I could realistically claim to 
“live” in either. And I wasn’t alone in trying to answer this difficult question—a number of 
friends asked me where I thought they should vote. Occasionally, there was an easy answer 
but in cases where both states in question were relatively close, I had no idea what advice to 
give. I was sure there had to be a way to answer the question—I just had to figure out how.   
This project is a result of these experiences and is my attempt to, if belatedly, finally 
deliver an answer to these questions. The paper is concerned with the Electoral College—its 
equitability in both design and practice, as well as the power with which it provides 
individual voters. It will not address types of voting systems, such as instant runoff voting, 
approval voting, or any other of the number of voting systems proposed by scholars. These 
systems are interesting areas of study but are beyond the scope of my research.  
5Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The election of 2000 sparked enormous controversy and brought a great deal of 
scrutiny upon the Electoral College. Vice President Albert Gore of Tennessee, the 
Democratic candidate, received approximately 500,000 more popular votes than Governor 
George W. Bush of Texas, the Republican candidate (Leip 2006). Bush, however, won the 
election by a narrow electoral vote tally of 271-2661 (Leip 2006). The state which put Bush 
over the top, Florida, inspired the greatest amount of debate. There Bush’s margin was a 
mere 537 votes and the Gore campaign requested a partial recount (i.e. that votes in selected 
counties were recounted to check for machine errors in processing ballots cast). The recount 
process produced something of a spectacle. Workers examined Florida’s punch ballots to 
determine if the “chad” (or hole) had been sufficiently punched to clearly indicate a desired 
vote (Guggenheim 2000). The recount continued until Florida’s Secretary of State, Katherine 
Harris, ordered an end to the recount. This move, of course, only added to the controversy 
because the Governor of Florida, Jeb Bush, was the brother of would-be President George 
W. Bush. The Gore campaign challenged, but Harris’s decision was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in a 5-4 decision (Bush v. Gore 2000). 
Additional contention was sparked by the use of the now infamous butterfly ballot in 
Palm Beach County. On the ballot a series of holes down the middle separated a list of 
candidates flanking the holes on either side. What was particularly confusing to voters was 
that the holes down the middle corresponded to candidates on alternating sides of the ballot. 
Thus, the second hole down the ballot corresponded to the first candidate on the right side, 
 
1 The final vote tally was one short of the normal total of 538 electoral votes because one Gore elector from 
the District of Columbia abstained from voting. 
6Patrick Buchanan, and the third hole down the ballot corresponded to the second candidate 
on the left side, Gore (See Figure 1).  
Figure 1: The infamous butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach County. 
[See: www.asktog.com/images/palmballot.jpg] 
Many voters reportedly accidentally cast their votes for Buchanan instead of Gore by 
punching the second hole from the top (CNN 2001). Adding insult to injury, Palm Beach 
County has a particularly large Jewish population, many of whom ended up voting for 
Buchanan (who has made anti-Semitic remarks in connection with the Holocaust) (Glazov 
2002).  
When the dust settled, the confidence of the American people in the Presidential 
electoral process was greatly shaken. The Electoral College had not only chosen a candidate 
who failed to win a plurality of the popular vote but had left the election to be determined 
by a few ‘pregnant’ chads and voters admittedly confused by the ballot style in Florida. 
These electoral mishaps would have been a mere sidebar in an election decided by a national 
popular vote. Furthermore, the election begged a more fundamental question: what qualified 
Floridians to choose who would be President? While voters in fifty states and the District of 
Columbia cast votes for the President, it was those in one lone state which proved to be 
decisive.  
Nationally, voters expressed great dissatisfaction with the manner in which the 
campaign was conducted. The two major party candidates, Bush and Gore, had spent nearly 
the entire campaign in just a handful of so-called “battleground states”, where the popular 
vote totals were expected to be close. The vast majority of the states were largely ignored, as 
their electoral votes were considered to be a foregone conclusion.  
7Calls for the abolition of the Electoral College were immediate and widespread. A 
Constitutional amendment was introduced in both the House and Senate which would allow 
for choosing the President by national popular vote instead of electoral vote. Senator Dick 
Durbin (D-IL) went so far as to call the Electoral College a “constitutional dinosaur” (Guzy 
2000). Public opinion polls showed that a majority of Americans (61%) were in agreement 
with the amendment (Warner 2000).  
Despite this public sentiment, the attempt to amend the Constitution was 
unsuccessful. The threshold for passing an amendment is quite high—two-thirds of the 
members of the House and Senate and three-quarters of the states have to agree. And, with a 
handful of states standing to lose substantial leverage from an amendment, this high 
threshold proved unattainable.   
This failure to abolish the Electoral College did not quell the debate surrounding its 
fairness. As the 2004 campaign entered the home stretch, similar dissatisfaction with the 
Electoral College emerged. In August, the New York Times published a harsh editorial once 
again calling for its abolishment:  
This election has been making clear how the Electoral College distorts 
presidential campaigns. A few swing states take on oversized importance, 
leading the candidates to focus their attention, money and promises on a 
small slice of the electorate. We are hearing far more this year about the issue 
of storing hazardous waste at Yucca Mountain, an important one for 
Nevada's 2.2 million residents, than about securing ports against terrorism, a 
vital concern for 19.2 million New Yorkers. (New York Times, August 29, 
2004) 
 
As the editorial indicates, the campaign was, once again, largely restricted to a 
handful of competitive states. Nevada, which Bush carried by a mere 2.6%, was 
considered to be a competitive state, while New York, which  Kerry carried by over 
18%, was not (Leip 2006).  
8Polls leading up to the election of 2004 showed the two candidates, incumbent 
President Bush and Senator John Kerry, running neck and neck, raising concerns that we 
would witness a repeat of the 2000 fiasco. On Election night, President Bush emerged 
victorious. This time he had been elected by the hefty electoral margin of 286 electoral votes 
to Kerry’s 252. Bush carried Ohio, the decisive state in the election, by just over 100,000 
votes. While the nation was spared from having to endure another recount, the election did 
generate fairness concerns. These concerns swirled around the use of electronic voting 
machines in Ohio, machines manufactured by companies with strong ties to the Republican 
Party. Wally O’Dell, the chief executive of one of the companies, Diebold, had famously (or 
infamously) committed "to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the President." 
(Fitrakis and Wasserman 2004). However, Bush’s popular vote margin of over three million 
votes hushed this opposition as the bulk of the public felt that he had legitimately obtained a 
popular mandate.   
While the public turned their attention away from the Electoral College, one 
innovator was hatching a new strategy to end it. John Koza, a Professor of Computer 
Science at Stanford, suggested that states cooperate to abolish the Electoral College through 
an interstate compact. This compact would require a group of states controlling a majority of 
electoral votes to agree to cast their electoral votes for the winner of the national popular 
vote.2
Interstate compacts were relatively rare until recent decades, during which they have 
mushroomed to cover a wide range of issues. These include agreements to: “share natural 
resources, such as water; build regional electric power sources; share parks and parkways; 
conserve fish and wildlife; protect air quality; manage radioactive and other hazardous 
 
2 While it is generally accepted that states allocate their electoral votes to the state popular vote winner, the 
Constitution grants them the ability to divvy them out as they see fit. 
9wastes; control natural disasters, such as floods; share educational resources and facilities; 
share police and fire departments; and grant reciprocity for driver's licenses.” (West’s 
Encyclopedia of American Law 1998) Because they are not federal policy, these agreements 
achieve enforcement through binding members to the terms of the agreement only when 
other members comply as well. For example, consider reciprocity between states in offering 
in-state tuition. If State A stops offering in-state tuition to students from State B, then State 
B simply responds in kind by no longer offering in-state tuition to students from State A. In 
the case of the compact to elect the winner of the national popular vote, the agreement does 
not go into force until states controlling the majority of electoral votes (270 or more) agree 
to the terms of the compact.  
Thus, if California had agreed to the compact it would not yet be bound to its terms. 
Until the compact had been signed by states controlling 270 or more electoral votes, 
California’s electoral votes would continue to be cast for the winner of the state popular vote 
and not the national popular vote. 
The first state to consider Koza’s proposal was, in fact, California, a potentially fertile 
ground given its large size and non-swing state status—California went to Gore by nearly 
12% and Kerry by nearly 10% (Leip 2006). As one Los Angeles Times editorial explained: 
“Under the current system, California issues—water, immigration, offshore drilling—don’t 
get debated because candidates never show up here, except to bum money off rich people. 
But in Iowa, there’s full discussion of corn and ethanol.” (Skelton 2006) The California 
legislature passed the bill by a party-line vote with the majority of the Democrats supporting 
the measure and the majority of the Republicans opposing the bill. However, the Austrian 
born governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, vetoed the bill on the grounds that it ran “counter 
to the tradition of our great nation.” (New York Times, October 3, 2006) 
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Schwarzenegger’s veto was certainly a large setback for the movement; with 
California’s 55 electoral votes, his signature would have put the compact over one-fifth of 
the way toward controlling the 270 electoral votes it needs to take effect. But the movement 
is far from dead. The group headed by Koza, National Popular Vote, has sponsors in 
twenty-nine states who plan to introduce the bill during their respective 2007 legislative 
sessions. The measure is not dead within California either; the group has pledged to re-
introduce the measure in California as a ballot initiative.  
It is still too early to tell just how much success the movement will have, but it is 
certain to reignite the national debate about the merits of the Electoral College. It is within 
this context that I will investigate the following question: is the Electoral College 
systematically biased in favor of particular states? Unlike the anecdotal examples used by 
many commentators to argue that a bias exists, such as the aforementioned New York Times 
editorial, I will conduct an empirical examination of Presidential elections since the advent of 
the Modern Presidency in 19323. This empirical analysis will also contrast greatly with the 
majority quantitative scholarship on the topic, which focuses more on the general tendency 
of the Electoral College to advantage large or small states instead of focusing on the 
tendency of particular states to be competitive (Banzhaf 1968; Lee and Openheimer 1999). 
My hypothesis is that a bias does exist, whereby certain individual states are advantaged 
when their large size and corresponding electoral votes combine with a tendency to be a 
closely contested state.  
The paper will proceed as follows: Chapter 2 will provide a background on the 
Electoral College, providing necessary context to understand the subsequent analysis. 
Chapter 3 will introduce the concept of voting power, which measures the ability of 
 
3 The Modern Presidency refers to the manner in which Franklin Roosevelt reshaped the Presidency to 
place the President at the center of the federal policy-making process (Hess 2002).  
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individuals to determine election outcomes, and examine previous applications of voting 
power to the Electoral College. Chapter 4 will introduce two original voting power indices 
created for this project to evaluate biases in the Electoral College since 1932. One index 
calculates how close each state has been to the pivotal position deciding the Electoral 
College vote (the Proximity Index) and the other estimates a state’s probability of being 
within 1% of the national popular vote (the Probability Index). Chapter 5 will analyze the 
results of these two new indices and use them to determine whether a bias exists and if that 
bias exists, which states are advantaged. Finally, Chapter 6 will consider possible 
improvements on the voting power indices I propose and provide potential directions for 
future research on the equity of the Electoral College. 
12
Chapter 2: A Brief History of the Electoral College 
 
Before analyzing the equity of the Electoral College, a bit of background would serve 
to inform the discussion. In this section, I will first explain how the Electoral College works, 
as its idiosyncratic structure is at the heart of a number of arguments against its equitability. 
Subsequently, I will discuss the undemocratic motivations for creating the Electoral College 
and discuss how our conceptualization of the Electoral College evolved to its current state, 
where it is expected to behave democratically.  
I. How the Electoral College Works 
 
While most citizens probably assume that they’re voting directly for a Presidential 
candidate when they cast their ballot every four years, they are actually voting for a group of 
intermediaries known as “electors”. In most states, written in small print next to the name of 
each presidential candidate is the phrase: “Electors for:”. These electors combine to form 
what is known as the Electoral College, which has been the method for choosing the 
President since the passage of the Constitution.  
The Electoral College is composed of 538 electors, each of which is permitted to cast 
one electoral vote. Electoral votes are assigned to each state according to their congressional 
delegation. Each state receives two electoral votes for their U.S. Senators as well as one for 
each member of the U.S. House. The state of Minnesota, for example, has ten electoral 
votes—two for its Senators and eight for its Congressmen. The District of Columbia 
receives a number of electoral votes equivalent to that of the least populous state, which 
translates to three electoral votes. Thus, the final tally of 538 electoral votes corresponds to 
the 100 members of the Senate, 435 members of the House and the 3 electoral votes given 
to the District of Columbia (see Table 1 for a breakdown of electors by state).  
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Table 1: Electoral Votes by State 
State Electoral Votes State Electoral Votes 
California 55 Connecticut 7 
Texas 34 Iowa 7 
New York 31 Oklahoma 7 
Florida 27 Oregon 7 
Illinois 21 Arkansas 6 
Pennsylvania 21 Kansas 6 
Ohio 20 Mississippi 6 
Michigan 17 Nebraska 5 
Georgia 15 Nevada 5 
New Jersey 15 New Mexico 5 
North Carolina 15 Utah 5 
Virginia 13 West Virginia 5 
Massachusetts 12 Hawaii 4 
Indiana 11 Idaho 4 
Missouri 11 Maine 4 
Tennessee 11 New Hampshire 4 
Washington 11 Rhode Island 4 
Arizona 10 Alaska 3 
Maryland 10 Delaware 3 
Wisconsin 10 District of Columbia 3 
Alabama 9 Montana 3 
Colorado 9 North Dakota 3 
Louisiana 9 South Dakota 3 
Minnesota 9 Vermont 3 
Kentucky 8 Wyoming 3 
South Carolina 8   
Each state has the ability to choose electors according to whatever method they 
deem to be appropriate. Today, every state and the District of Columbia choose their 
electors according to a state popular vote. This practice has become so institutionalized that 
it is easy to forget that states still possess the ability to choose electors by alternate manners.  
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia use the unit rule to assign electors. 
The unit rule dictates that the candidate receiving the most popular votes (or plurality) 
within a state is given all of the electoral votes within a state. States utilizing the unit rule 
treat each vote for a candidate as a vote for their entire slate of electors meaning that if 
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Candidate A receives just one more vote than Candidate B, then all of Candidate A’s electors 
will be individually elected by a margin of one vote. The unit rule evolved as a strategy for 
states to increase their leverage in the electoral process. Originally, states elected individual 
electors who could vote for the candidate of their choice. However, they realized that their 
strategic importance increased when they controlled a bloc of votes as a state as opposed to 
a series of individual votes. 
The other two states, Maine and Nebraska, use a slightly different system to assign 
their electors. Two electoral votes are given to the candidate who receives the most popular 
votes statewide. The rest of the electoral votes are assigned according to the candidate who 
receives the most votes within each congressional district. The rationale for this plan is to 
make their states, which would otherwise be uncompetitive, into smaller, more competitive 
districts.  
The voting process has gradually evolved to the current state whereby individual 
electors are no longer listed on the ballot or even known by more than a handful of 
members of the general public. Some states have attempted to remedy the problem of 
“faithless electors”, where an elector who has agreed to support the candidate from one 
party chooses not to vote for that candidate, by legally binding them to vote for a particular 
candidate. A faithless elector can, depending on a state, face legal consequences.  
II. Undemocratic Origins: The Founders and the Electoral College 
 
The Electoral College has not always functioned as it does now; like many aspects of 
American government, it has evolved with changing political norms and whenever electoral 
difficulties have inspired reform. However, in order to understand this evolution, one must 
first understand why the Electoral College was even included in the Constitution at all.    
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The two potential electoral systems which were first considered by the Founders 
were selection of the President by Congress and selection of the President via popular vote 
(Milkis and Nelson 1994; 32). Holding a national popular vote was rejected as being too 
democratic—the Founders did not have sufficient confidence in the general public to entrust 
them with such an important decision (Milkis and Nelson 1994; 32). They were concerned 
that they would be ill-informed and prone to violent swings in opinion (Hamilton 1788). 
Election via Congress was the leading option for a period of time but there was great 
reluctance to adopt such a system. In particular, they were concerned that such an electoral 
system would prevent the President from having sufficient independence from the 
legislature, particularly if he were wishing to seek re-election (Milkis and Nelson 1994; 32). 
Moreover, small states feared that the large states would dominate the process because the 
House of Representative was so much larger than the Senate (Milkis and Nelson 1994; 33). 
As a result, there was much searching for an intermediate solution which would provide for 
election via a more informed and stable group but that came from outside of the 
government. 
It was within this context that the Electoral College emerged as a compromise. The 
system of electors ensured that election of the President was done according to the judgment 
of fewer and better informed individuals. Alexander Hamilton explains in Federalist No. 68: 
A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general 
mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment 
requisite to such complicated investigations. It was also particularly desirable 
to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder…The choice 
of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less 
apt to convulse with the community with any extraordinary or violent 
movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object 
of the public wishes. (Hamilton 1788) 
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Electors were also not allowed to hold national office in order to avoid a conflict of interest. 
Thus, there were seen as informed and impartial arbiters who would serve as the optimal 
agents for choosing the President. 
The manner in which electors are to be elected is not specified in the Constitution, 
leaving it up to each state to choose instead. This was a compromise on two levels. First, it 
was a concession to those hoping to maintain a strong state role relative to the federal 
government. Second, it resolved the disagreement over whether it would be better to select 
electors using the state legislature or using a statewide popular vote. This division in how 
electors are chosen persisted until 1836 by which time all states except South Carolina had 
begun using the popular vote as the electoral selection method. South Carolina became the 
final state to switch to the popular vote in 1860 (Kimberling 1992).  
III. Reexamination of the Electoral College: The “One Man, One Vote” Principle 
 
Despite its undemocratic beginnings, our understanding of the Electoral College has 
since changed. During the civil rights movement of the 1960’s, greater attention was paid to 
voting equality, with the landmark case, Baker v. Carr (1962), providing a legal basis for 
protecting this right. The principle of “one man, one vote” first outlined in Carr was 
subsequently justified in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) as follows: “To say that a vote is worth 
more in one district than it is in another would…run counter to our fundamental ideas of 
democratic government.” Similarly in Reynolds v. Sims (1964) the Court stated: “The right of 
suffrage is denied by debasement or dilution of a citizen's vote in a state or federal election.” 
It should be noted, however, that these rulings only applied to congressional elections and 
not to Presidential elections, which are governed separately by Article II, Section I in the 
Constitution.  
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In subsequent years there were a series of challenges to the Electoral College based 
upon the “one man, one vote” principle. Most notably, there as an extended debate in 
Congress over a constitutional amendment that would have abolished the Electoral College 
in favor of a national popular vote. The main proponents of the amendment were Rep. John 
B. Anderson of Illinois and Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana. The amendment passed the 
House and ultimately failed by only a few votes to reach the required super-majority within 
the Senate in 1970 and 1979 (Broder 2007).  
 Despite failing to amend the Constitution, this debate did fundamentally alter the 
way Americans think about the Electoral College. Concerns that the Electoral College is 
undemocratic have continued to be voiced since the amendment failed in the 1970’s. Yet for 
the frequency with which this criticism is leveled, there is relatively little systematic data to 
support it. The following section will discuss some of the techniques which have been 
offered as well as their relative advantages and shortcomings.  
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Chapter 3: Voting Power 
I. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will begin the process of analyzing the Electoral College. The basis 
for this analysis will be the concept of “voting power”. “Voting power…is generally defined 
in terms of the possibilities that a given voter or set of voters can affect the outcome of an 
election” (Gelman, Katz and Tuerlinckx 2002; 420). The power of an individual voter is 
assigned a value between zero and one, where zero indicates that the voter has no impact on 
the election outcome and one indicates the voter has complete control over the election 
outcome. Calculations of voting power are more difficult when applied to the Electoral 
College because it is a two-stage voting process—individuals vote for electors who then vote 
for the President. Thus, in order to determine the voting power of an individual, one must 
first determine their power in choosing particular electors and then determine the power of 
those electors in determining the outcome of the Presidential election. These two results are 
then multiplied together because they can be treated as independent results. 
Within the scholarship, there are two broad categories of voting power analysis: a
priori and empirical. A priori measures of voting power have emerged as the dominant lens 
through which scholars evaluate the equitability of the Electoral College. A priori measures 
mean that we adopt a sort of “veil of ignorance” whereby we design an election system 
based on its ability to produce equitable election results in theory. (Felsenthal and Machover 
2004; 14) We do not consider known partisan tendencies of particular states or regions of 
the country, nor do we consider know partisan tendencies of individuals. The base 
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assumption, therefore, is that each individual voter is equally likely to vote for each of the 
two candidates4.
While such an approach seems to omit critical information, this omission is 
intentional. A priori measures determine whether an electoral system is equitable in a purely 
theoretical sense (i.e. if it would produce fair election results if partisan preferences were 
randomly distributed throughout the country). Besides testing the theoretical legitimacy of an 
electoral system, a priori models also have the benefit of making no assumptions about the 
continuity of historical voting patterns. Over the years, voting tendencies within states have 
shifted greatly and often unpredictably. While empirical analysis could be undermined by 
such shifts, a priori analysis insulates itself from such concerns by simply not taking them into 
account.  
 Empirical analysis, on the other hand, focuses on past election results in order to 
understand potential biases within the electoral system. These analyses have traditionally 
been neglected within the scholarship; scholars have lavished far more attention on a priori 
measures. For this reason, I will begin by explaining the two dominant measures of a priori 
voting power, the Banzhaf Index and the Shapley-Shubik Index. Subsequently I will outline 
the extent of the empirical research that has been done and provide the methodology I will 
use to conduct my analysis.  
II. A priori Voting Power 
 
As indicated above, two indices of voting analysis have dominated scholarly 
treatment of a priori voting power. The central difference between the two indices is that the 
Banzhaf Index is based upon the idea of a decisive vote while the Shapley-Shubik Index is 
 
4 We do not consider third party candidates as their inclusion would greatly complicate the calculation. 
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based upon the idea of a pivotal vote.5 A voter is said to cast a decisive vote when he/she is a 
tie-breaking vote (meaning that the rest of the electorate is evenly split). A voter is said to 
cast a pivotal vote when he/she casts the vote which secures a victory for a particular 
candidate (e.g. in an electorate of three voters the pivotal vote is the second for a candidate, 
in an electorate of five voters the pivotal vote is the third for a candidate, etc.). 
The following are examples to further illuminate the distinction. Let’s say that we 
have an electorate of three voters and they vote for Candidate A by a 2-1 margin. Both of 
the votes for candidate A are considered decisive because with their vote removed the tally 
would be 1-1. However, only the second vote for Candidate A is considered pivotal because 
after the first vote for Candidate A, victory had not yet been secured.6 Now let’s imagine that 
the voters supported Candidate A by a 3-0 margin. In this case, none of the voters would be 
considered decisive. However, the voter who casts the second vote for Candidate A is still 
considered to be pivotal. 
It should be noted that these two concepts aren’t mutually exclusive; a voter can be 
both decisive and pivotal within an electorate. Let’s again assume that three voters are 
choosing between two candidates. If the first two voters split their votes between the two 
candidates, the third voter will be both decisive and pivotal because the electorate is tied 
prior to the vote and because the vote will constitute the second, or pivotal, vote for the 
winning candidate.  
Given this basic definition, I will now outline how the indices themselves are 
calculated. I will start with the Banzhaf Index because it has received the bulk of scholarly 
 
5 This distinction between the two terms is not clearly established within the literature, but I believe it 
provides a convenient nomenclature for separating the concepts. 
6 With the Shapley-Shubik Index order is typically assigned according to intensity of support. However, 
this is not possible in an electoral context—we know nothing about how strongly citizens supported a 
particular candidate, only that they chose to (or not to) vote for that candidate. Thus, order is randomly 
assigned such that all those within a winning coalition are considered equally likely to cast the pivotal vote.   
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attention paid to a priori voting power measures. I will then discuss the Shapley-Shubik 
Index, another measure of a priori voting power. Finally, I will discuss empirical measures of 
voting power.  
III. The Banzhaf Index 
 
The most studied measure of voting power, at least in the context of the Electoral 
College, is the Banzhaf Index. The index is named after the lawyer, John Banzhaf III, who 
popularized the method in the 1960’s during the last heated national debate over the 
Electoral College. In a series of articles throughout the decade, Banzhaf developed the index 
(Banzhaf 1965; Banzhaf 1966) and applied it to the Electoral College (Banzhaf 1968). He 
found that the largest state in the union, which at the time was New York, had 3.312 times 
the voting power as the District of Columbia.7
Banzhaf’s work received substantial attention following its publication. His work 
proved quite influential in informing opposition to the Electoral College during the 
congressional debate of an amendment which would have abolished it (Bayh 1968). It has 
also been used as a baseline for subsequent scholarship considering the question of voting 
power. Scholars still use the index to determine state biases in the Electoral College (most 
recently, Longley and Dana Jr. (1992) updated the index based upon changes in state 
population and electoral vote distribution).  
As stated earlier, the Banzhaf Index is an a priori index, meaning that we have no 
information about the preferences of individual voters, and relies on the notion of a decisive, 
or tie-breaking, vote as the source of voting power. The index then calculates the probability, 
 
7 While Banzhaf often receives credit for developing the method used in his articles, it is actually a re-
creation of earlier work done by L.S. Penrose. Penrose had developed the index nearly two decades earlier 
as a method for apportioning vote weight within the United Nations (Penrose 1946). Scholars attribute this 
re-creation to a case of “mistaken reinvention” (Felsen and Machover 2005). 
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given an electorate of size n, of the first n-1 voters casting the same number of votes for two 
candidates8—for simplicity, we will refer to them as Candidate A and Candidate B. The 
formula for the Banzhaf Index is as follows (where id refers to an individual voter being 
decisive, and n refers to the population of the state):  
Equation 1: Banzhaf Index determination of an individual’s voting power.  
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Let’s start with some basic examples to demonstrate the calculation of the index. 
Assume that there is an electorate of three voters choosing between Candidate A and 
Candidate B. To measure the voting power for a single voter, we look at the potential 
combinations of votes from the other two voters which are: AA, AB, BA, BB (where AA 
represents two votes for Candidate A, AB represents the first voter voting for Candidate A 
and the second for Candidate B, etc.). All of these combinations are equally likely because 
we’re assuming that we have no information about voter preferences. Accordingly, the 
probability of a single voter being decisive is one-half; the voter is decisive in the AB and BA 
cases but not in the AA and BB cases. This same result can be obtained by substituting n =3 
into Equation 1: 
Calculation 1: Determination of voting power under the Banzhaf Index given a population of three voters.
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8 The calculation of the index becomes a bit more complicated if we allow for the possibility of n-1 being 
odd, such that the closest possible margin between the candidates is one vote and not a tie. The voting 
power of a voter, then, would derive from their ability to cause or avoid a tie. However, because the 
calculation works out nearly identically over large sample sizes whether n-1 is even or odd, we will assume 
n-1 is even for conceptual simplicity.  
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We could continue with such examples, but writing out the potential combinations 
of votes quickly becomes unwieldy. Luckily, the binomial distribution allows one to quickly 
calculate these probabilities without tediously writing out the combinations. Table 2 shows a 
series of population sizes and the corresponding voting power of an individual within a 
population that size. The third column is a function inversely related to the square root of 
population size. As the population size increases voting power tracks closely with this 
function, allowing one to approximate voting power for large populations.  
 
Table 2: Banzhaf Index Probability that a Voter is Decisive According to Population Size 
 
Population Size 
 
Voting Power n
8.0
3 0.500 0.462 
5 0.375 0.358 
9 0.273 0.267 
15 0.209 0.207 
45 0.120 0.119 
101 0.080 0.080 
1001 0.025 0.025 
10,001 0.0080 0.0080 
100,001 0.0025 0.0025 
1,000,0001 0.0008 0.0008 
The Electoral College, however, is a two-staged voting process, making the 
calculation of voting power more complicated. Individuals first vote to determine a slate of 
electors for their state. These electors then vote to determine which candidate will be elected 
President. Thus, an individual’s voting power is the joint probability that their vote will 
swing their state’s electoral votes and that their state’s electoral votes will prove to be the 
decisive margin in electing the President. Mathematically, we can treat these as independent 
events, so that the probability of both events occurring is simply the product of the 
probability of each of the individual events. Thus, voting power is equal to the probability of 
an individual’s vote being decisive within their state times the probability of their state being 
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decisive in the Electoral College (EC refers to the Electoral College, id refers to an individual 
voter being decisive, and sd refers to the state being decisive within the Electoral College): 
Equation 2: Voting power of an individual within the Electoral College—expressed as the product of an 
individual’s voting power with a state and that state’s voting power within the Electoral College. 
 
sdidEC PowerPowerPower *=
For example, let’s refer back to our basic example with two candidates, A and B, 
three voters, and now three states as well. We’ve already calculated the probability of casting 
a decisive vote within each state as being equal to one-half. The probability of that voter’s 
state being decisive is also equal to one-half by an identical calculation—there are four 
potential outcomes for the other two states (AA, AB, BA and BB), half of which would 
make the third state decisive. Thus we can say that the net voting power is equal to one-
fourth (one-half multiplied by one-half).  
In the example in the preceding paragraph, the states are all considered to have one 
electoral vote. However, the calculation is far more complicated because the Electoral 
College is an example of a weighted voting system—states have different numbers of 
electoral votes depending on their size. Thus, we can’t treat them as interchangeable units; 
instead we have to look at specific combinations of states in order to determine whether 
they provide a decisive margin. This produces an impossible calculation when you consider 
that there are fifty states and the District of Columbia, producing over two quadrillion 
potential divisions of states between the two parties. While we could reduce the calculation a 
bit by treating states with the same number of electoral votes (such as Wyoming and Alaska) 
interchangeably, it would still prove unreasonably complicated9.
9 This analysis assumes that all states use the unit rule (meaning that all the state’s electors go to one 
candidate). However, two states, Maine and Nebraska distribute their electoral votes in a different 
manner—assigning two electors to the winner of the state popular vote and assigning each additional 
elector according to the candidate which carries the popular vote within each of the state’s congressional 
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Conveniently, the calculation works out such that each state has voting power 
approximately proportionate to the number of electoral votes it has. Thus, Minnesota, a state 
with ten electoral votes, has approximately twice the voting power of Nebraska, a state with 
five electoral votes. This does not mean that each voter in Minnesota has twice the power of 
each voter in Nebraska, but simply that the state, as a whole, has twice the power. We can 
extrapolate this relationship between electoral votes and population size by using the fact 
that electoral votes are approximately proportional to a state’s population (where sd refers to 
the state being decisive, EV refers to electoral votes, s refers to a state, and US refers to the 
national total): 
Equation 3: Banzhaf Index determination of a state’s voting power within the Electoral College.
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Thus, in order to determine the voting power of an individual voter in choosing the 
President, we must multiply the probability that the voter will be decisive within their state 
by the probability that the state is decisive within the Electoral College. From the initial 
calculations of voting power, we saw that voting power within a state decreases at a rate 
proportional to the square root of population size (see Equation 1). However, that state has 
a number of electoral votes approximately proportional to its population and those electoral 
votes have a directly proportional effect on that state’s ability to choose the President (see 
Equation 3). Multiplying those two results together, we find that an individual’s voting 
power in choosing the President increases at a rate proportional to the square root of 
population size:  
 
districts. In practice, the electoral votes of these two states all tend be won by one candidate during each 
election cycle, meaning we can effectively treat them as using the unit rule (to simplify our analysis).  
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Equation 4: Banzhaf Index determination of an individual’s voting power under the Electoral College.
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This result has led scholars utilizing the Banzhaf Index to conclude that there exists the 
aforementioned large state bias, such as the discrepancy between New York and the District 
of Columbia identified by Banzhaf (see Table 3).  
These results were the standard in the field for a number of decades but have come 
under fire in the last few years. The main thrust of the criticism is that the a priori model of 
voting behavior is not accurate. In particular, critics take issue with the claim that the 
probability of casting a decisive vote within a particular state is inversely related to the square 
root of population size. Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2002) conducted an empirical study 
using regression analysis where they found that the probability of casting a decisive vote is 
far closer to being inversely related to population size. The problem with the a priori model is 
that it assumes that candidate vote shares will converge toward 50% with a large enough 
sample size, as you would expect with other random processes such as coin flips and, as 
such, not reflecting the observed preferences of voters. However, in most states there is at 
least a slight bias toward one candidate or another. Given this bias, as the voting population 
increases, the net percentage received by each of the candidates will converge toward the 
unbalanced proportion instead of toward 50%.  
Not all scholarship argues against the Banzhaf Index; Brams and Davis (1974) 
attempt to correct for this shortcoming by allowing the expected vote distribution to vary 
from 50% within the binomial model and find that the large state bias persists. If Gelman, 
Katz and Bafumi (2002) are correct, however, the argument for a large state bias is severely 
undermined. A decrease in individual voting power within a state which is proportional to 
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Table 3: Banzhaf Index calculation from 1968 showing a large-state bias (this table is a modified version of 
that published in Banzhaf 1968) 
 
State Name 
Population  
(1960 Census) 
Electoral Votes (1964)  
Banzhaf Index* 
New York 16,782,304 43 3.312 
California 15,717,204 40 3.162 
Pennsylvania 11,319,366 29 2.638 
Ohio 9,706,397 26 2.539 
Illinois 10,081,158 26 2.491 
Texas 9,579,677 25 2.452 
Michigan 7,823,194 21 2.262 
New Jersey 6,066,782 17 2.063 
Florida 4,951,560 14 1.870 
Alaska 226,167 3 1.838 
Massachusetts 5,148,578 14 1.834 
North Carolina 4,556,155 13 1.807 
Georgia 3,943,116 12 1.789 
Wisconsin 3,951,777 12 1.788 
Indiana 4,662,498 13 1.786 
Virginia 3,966,949 12 1.784 
Tennessee 3,567,089 11 1.721 
Missouri 4,319,813 12 1.710 
Maryland 3,100,689 10 1.675 
Nevada 285,278 3 1.636 
Louisiana 3,257,022 10 1.635 
Alabama 3,266,740 10 1.632 
Minnesota 3,413,864 10 1.597 
Iowa 2,757,537 9 1.596 
Washington 2,853,214 9 1.569 
Oklahoma 2,328,284 8 1.541 
South Carolina 2,382,594 8 1.524 
Kentucky 3,038,156 9 1.521 
Wyoming 330,066 3 1.521 
West Virginia 1,860,421 7 1.506 
New Hampshire 606,921 4 1.499 
Connecticut 2,535,234 8 1.477 
Hawaii 632,772 4 1.468 
North Dakota 632,446 4 1.468 
Idaho 667,191 4 1.429 
Montana 674,767 4 1.421 
South Dakota 680,514 4 1.415 
Vermont 389,881 3 1.400 
Kansas 2,178,611 7 1.392 
Mississippi 2,178,141 7 1.392 
Colorado 1,753,947 6 1.327 
Oregon 1,768,687 6 1.321 
Arkansas 1,786,272 6 1.315 
Delaware 446,292 3 1.308 
Arizona 1,302,161 5 1.281 
Rhode Island 859,488 4 1.259 
Utah 890,627 4 1.237 
Nebraska 1,411,330 5 1.231 
New Mexico 951,023 4 1.197 
Maine 969,265 4 1.186 
District of Columbia 763,956 3 1.000 
* The Banzhaf Index represents the relative probability of an individual voter being decisive within the 
Electoral College. The probability is calculated by multiplying the probability of an individual voter being 
decisive within a state by the probability that the state is decisive within the Electoral College (see Equation 4).  
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the population size would balance out the proportional increase in voting power the state 
possesses within the Electoral College, producing no net bias (except, possibly, toward the 
smaller states due to the constant two electoral votes). 
A more important shortcoming of the Banzhaf Index is its a priori assumptions. 
While these assumptions may be appealing from a theoretical perspective, they ignore well-
established partisan tendencies of particular segments of the population and, more broadly, 
particular regions of the country.  
IV. The Shapley-Shubik Index 
 
The other classic measure of voting power is known as the “Shapley-Shubik Index”. 
This index was proposed in a 1954 paper examining the distribution of power within the 
legislative process, determining the relative influence of the House of Representatives, 
Senate and President (Shapley and Shubik 1954). In the Shapley-Shubik Index an individual’s 
voting power “depends on the chance he has of being critical to the success of a winning 
coalition” (Shapley and Shubik 1954; 787), which is equivalent to the concept of a pivotal 
vote, as introduced earlier. Using our simple three person electorate, the second person to 
cast a vote for the winning candidate casts the pivotal vote and is considered to possess all of 
the voting power. The other two voters in this case are treated as having no voting power.  
This, however, assumes that there is an ordering to the votes. Such an ordering could 
be chronological or based upon intensity of preference. To differentiate these two orderings, 
let’s assume that the U.S. Senate is considering a bill to cut taxes. A chronological ordering 
would look at a floor vote, and credit the member casting the 51st vote in one direction or 
the other to be pivotal. An ordering based upon intensity of preference would order senators 
according to their position on the issue—ranging from those completely opposing a tax cut 
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to the senator supporting the largest cut in taxes. The senator, or senators, occupying the 
central position along this spectrum would represent the pivotal votes as their support is 
critical to forging a winning coalition (assuming, of course, that the only question is how big 
the tax cut should be and not from where the tax cut should come)10.
In the case of Presidential elections, such orderings of individual voters are not 
possible, as data are not released on when individuals cast their votes, nor is there any 
indication of intensity of preference other than the dichotomous decision to vote or not vote 
for a particular candidate.  The impact on the voting power calculation can be demonstrated 
again using our three person electorate. If two out of three voters supported Candidate A, 
then they both have a voting power of one-half, as they have the same probability of casting 
the “second” vote (if we were to randomly order the votes). Meanwhile, the voter 
supporting Candidate B has a voting power of zero as the vote did not form a part of the 
winning coalition.  
Unlike the Banzhaf Index, the Shapley-Shubik Index does not require an extremely 
close election for an individual to have voting power. In a 3-0 “landslide” election, all three 
voters are considered equally likely to have cast the pivotal second vote and are assigned a 
voting power of one-third. Thus, the Shapley-Shubik avoids a common criticism leveled 
against the Banzhaf Index: that Presidential elections are never close enough for a voter to 
have more than negligible voting power.  
Using the a priori assumption that we have no information about the preferences of 
individual voters, each individual within the population will have an equal probability of 
 
10 This concept of pivotal voter in an ideological spectrum also serves as the basis for the Median Voter 
Theorem, which argues that this pivotal voter will act as the decision-maker. The most common application 
of the theorem is to argue that candidates should race to the middle in order to position themselves as close 
as possible to the pivotal (or median) voter. For a more complete discussion of the theorem see, for 
example: Congleton, Richard. 2002. “The Median Voter Model.” Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Available 
online at: http://rdc1.net/forthcoming/medianvt.pdf. 
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occupying the pivotal position (ip refers to the individual voter being pivotal, and n refers to 
the population size): 
Equation 5: Shapley-Shubik determination of the probability of an individual voter being decisive. 
nPowerip
1=
Again, the fact that the Electoral College is a two-tiered voting system makes it more 
difficult to calculate the Shapley-Shubik Index. It is relatively easy to determine the voting 
power within each state—an individual voting for the winning candidate has a power 
inversely proportional to the number of total voters supporting that candidate. An individual 
voting for the losing candidate, of course, has no voting power. States then have power 
according to the probability that their state was the decisive one. This is not as simple as 
dividing power equally among the states supporting the winning candidate because they have 
different weights. Instead, all possible orderings of states must be considered and voting 
power is equal to the proportion of combinations that make a particular state decisive. 
However, there is a calculative shortcut—states tend to occupy the pivotal position which a 
frequency proportional to the number of electoral votes the state possesses. As we did with 
the Banzhaf Index, we can then translate this voting power to population sizes (where sp 
refers to the state being pivotal, EV refers to electoral votes, s refers to an individual state, 
and US refers to the national total): 
Equation 6: Shapley-Shubik determination of a state’s voting power within the Electoral College. 
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Applying a priori assumptions to the Shapley-Shubik Index, we do not find a large-
state bias, as there was with the Banzhaf Index. Individuals within a state are all equally likely 
to occupy the pivotal position, such that the voting power is inversely proportional to the 
31
population of a state. States are allocated electoral votes approximately proportional to their 
population, and these states in turn occupy the pivotal position with a frequency 
proportional to the number of electoral votes. Thus, the decreased voting power from living 
in a large state is precisely balanced out by the increased voting power stemming from 
influencing a greater number of electoral votes: 
Equation 7: Shapley-Shubik voting power of an individual voter within the Electoral College. 
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Like the Banzhaf Index, however, there are some problems with using the Shapley-
Shubik Index to measure a priori voting power. At the state level, the a priori assumption that 
all orderings are equally likely is untenable. In recent elections, we have seen certain states, 
such as Utah, are strongly Republican, while other states, such as Massachusetts, are strongly 
Democratic. Instead, the Shapley-Shubik Index would be far more instructive if applied to 
empirical data. Each election provides the information necessary to order each state from 
most Republican to most Democratic, while, in the process, revealing which state occupied 
the pivotal position.  
Moreover, empirical determinations using the Shapley-Shubik would be superior to 
empirical determinations using the Banzhaf Index. While the Banzhaf Index is limited by the 
lack of elections sufficiently close for an individual voter to cast a “decisive” vote or an 
individual state to cast a slate of decisive electoral votes, each election produces a pivotal 
state using the Shapley-Shubik methodology.  
V .  E m p i r i c a l  E s t i m a t e s  o f  V o t i n g  P o w e r  
 
The most notable empirical work on voting power is scholarship published in recent 
years evaluating the validity of the assumptions underlying the Banzhaf Index. This analysis 
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has had to overcome one substantial obstacle: the paucity of actual election results close 
enough for a tie-breaking vote to be cast. Mulligan and Hunter (2003; 37) summarize this 
difficulty in analyzing their data set: “Of the 16577 US returns analyzed, only one…was 
decided by a single vote…Two others were decided by 4 votes, one by 5, and two by 9 votes. 
All 16577 [sic] others were decided by at least 14 votes. Of the 40036 STATE 
elections…analyzed, two were tied and seven were decided by a single vote.”  
 Nevertheless, Gelman, Katz and Tuerlinckx (2002) and Gelman, Katz and Bafumi 
(2004) used regression analysis on state legislature, U.S. House and U.S. Senate election 
returns to test the proposition that the probability of a voter casting a decisive vote decreases 
proportional to the square root of population size. They found that the probability decreases 
approximately proportional to the population size. This finding led both sets of scholars to 
question Banzhaf’s conclusion that there exists a large state bias.  
 Mulligan and Hunter (2003) conduct a similar empirical analysis, using the 
aforementioned data set. Their study also concluded that voting power decreases at a rate 
approximately proportional to population size, although they concede that these findings are 
cast into doubt by the few elections which prove to be sufficiently close for a decisive vote 
to exist.  
 Other scholars have used empirical data to craft their own models for voting power. 
Gelman, King and Boscardin (1998) used regression analysis to develop a model for the 
voting power of individual states. This regression model allows them to predict the range of 
possible state-level election results. From this range, they are able to calculate the probability 
that a state election will be close (defined in the paper as both major party candidates 
receiving within 2% of half the two-party popular vote). This propensity to be “close”, 
coupled with the state’s empirical propensity to be decisive within the Electoral College is 
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used to determine the voting power of individuals within each state. They conclude that 
there is no bias according to state size, but that there is a bias toward certain states which 
tend to be competitive and against those which tend to have one-sided election results (the 
examples of Utah and the District of Columbia are given).  
 Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1986) develop a spectrum where both the ideology and 
partisanship of each state is considered. Each election is weighted according to the degree to 
which is draws upon the ideological and partisan factors respectively. Accordingly, 
Rabinowitz and Macdonald determine which states occupy the Shapley-Shubik pivotal 
position for each election such that the candidate who carries that state will be guaranteed to 
carry the election as well. They determine the voting power of each state and highlight those 
states they believe to be advantaged by the Electoral College (California, Texas, Illinois, and 
Ohio ranking as the greatest benefactors) and those who they believe to be disadvantaged 
(Massachusetts, Georgia, Arizona and Nebraska rank as the biggest losers).  
 The method developed in the following section of my paper will focus on the 
importance of occupying the pivotal position, just as Rabinowitz and Macdonald did. 
However, I will simplify the process of ordering states by considering only partisan 
preference. I believe that Rabinowitz and Macdonald’s focus on both ideology and 
partisanship within the “political space” (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1986; 73) unnecessarily 
complicates the analysis. The important feature of a state in any given election is occupying 
the pivotal position between the Democratic and Republican parties. This simplification is 
advantageous because it makes the results more easily interpretable and subsequently more 
useful in public debate on the topic. People are generally skeptical of results they don’t 
understand, so my hope is that my methodology will represent a clearer, more intuitive 
revision of Rabinowitz and Macdonald’s approach.  
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Second, my methodology will re-order states for each election, allowing for evolution 
in partisan tendencies. Rabinowitz and Macdonald unrealistically assume that states occupy a 
static position within the political space. Thus, I believe that my method will not only be 
easier to understand, but also provide a more accurate understanding of voting power.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
Based upon the above discussion, this project will utilize empirical methods to 
determine the voting power of different states. These empirical methods will avoid the 
problematic assumption, inherent in a priori models, that there are no known partisan 
tendencies. While empirical analyses have been used to modify, criticize and improve 
existing a priori models, no scholarship has established a manner for determining voting 
power in a purely empirical manner. It is this gap which I will attempt to fill with the 
following indices of voting power and subsequent analysis. 
My indices of voting power will draw upon the methodology used in the Shapley-
Shubik Index by focusing on the importance of occupying the pivotal position. I will 
simplify the analysis by focusing only on the voting power of states within the Electoral 
College. This is not to say that the variation in voting power of individuals within the state is 
unimportant, but simply that its importance is trumped by the variation in voting power 
among different states. And, since an individual’s vote is only powerful if the state is pivotal 
within the Electoral College, the state having voting power is a prerequisite to an individual 
within that state having voting power. 
In determining the relative voting power of states, I reject the a priori assumption that 
any ordering of states is equally likely and instead choose to order them by intensity of preference 
as per the Shapley-Shubik methodology11. States are treated as expressing a partisan 
preference according to the difference in the percent of the popular vote which goes to the 
Democratic candidate and the percent of the popular vote which goes to the Republican 
 
11 This ordering is quite similar to that used by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1986). It is simplified in that it 
considers only partisan ordering of states and does not consider the ideological aspects examined by 
Rabinowitz and Macdonald. The advantage of this simplification is discussed at the end of Chapter 3.  
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candidate. In the 2004 election, for example, the extremes of this ordering would be Utah 
(where Bush carried the state by a margin of 45.5%) and the District of Columbia (where 
Kerry carried the state by a margin of 79.8%). Table 4 shows how states would be ordered 
for the 2004 Presidential election as an example. The directionality of the ordering of states 
(from most Republican to most Democratic) is arbitrary, and could be reversed without any 
substantive change. The goal is simply to provide a stable orientation for the analysis12.
Analysis will be conducted using data13 from 1932, the beginning of the Modern 
Presidency, to the present. While this data set excludes some potentially interesting close 
elections (such as those of 1824, 1876 and 1888), it best captures the modern political 
landscape. The data includes the percentage of the popular vote received by the Democratic 
and Republican candidates respectively as well as the number of electoral votes the state 
possessed at the time. Thus, to obtain the partisan differentials necessary for the subsequent 
analysis, the Republican popular vote percentage is subtracted from the Democratic popular 
vote percentage. Relevant electoral vote totals can be obtained by summing the electoral 
votes in the table for each relevant state.  
 Given this ordering of states, we can then look at the elections within the data set to 
see which states have occupied the Shapley-Shubik pivotal position, meaning that the state’s 
electoral votes where the ones which allowed the candidate to reach the critical threshold of 
 
12 The exclusion of third party votes from consideration is justified by the fact that a third party candidate has 
not carried an election within the relevant data set. This is not to say that third party candidates have not had an 
important effect on election outcomes during this period; most recently, with the formation of segregationist 
parties in the South following World War II, third party candidates have carried a handful of states as well as 
potentially swinging the election results within other states. However, in none of these elections have third 
party candidates carried enough states to deny either major party candidate a majority of electoral votes. Thus, 
we can consider the carrying of some states by third party candidates to be essentially inconsequential to the 
election outcome. Regardless of which major party candidate those states would have gone to in the absence of 
a third party, the same candidate would have been elected President. The critical votes come from those states 
casting their electoral votes for major party candidates and, accordingly, the votes of interest in those states are 
those for one major party candidate or another. 
13 State by state election returns are available at a number of locations, but I will use the data set contained in 
Dave Leip’s Presidential Atlas (available online at www.usaelectionatlas.org) because the site has compiled all of 
this data into a single Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, allowing for quick and easy analysis. 
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Table 4: Shapley-Shubik ordering of states for the 2004 election from most Republican to most Democratic. 
 
State 
Partisan Margin 
(%) 
Deviation from 
National Vote 
Cumulative 
Electoral Votes 
Utah -45.54 -42.10 5 
Wyoming -39.79 -36.35 8 
Idaho -38.12 -34.68 12 
Nebraska -33.22 -29.78 17 
Oklahoma -31.14 -27.70 24 
North Dakota -27.36 -23.92 27 
Alabama -25.62 -22.18 36 
Alaska -25.55 -22.11 39 
Kansas -25.38 -21.94 45 
Texas -22.86 -19.42 79 
South Dakota -21.47 -18.03 82 
Indiana -20.68 -17.24 93 
Montana -20.50 -17.06 96 
Kentucky -19.86 -16.42 104 
Mississippi -19.72 -16.28 110 
South Carolina -17.08 -13.64 118 
Georgia -16.59 -13.15 133 
Louisiana -14.51 -11.07 142 
Tennessee -14.27 -10.83 153 
West Virginia -12.86 -9.42 158 
North Carolina -12.43 -8.99 173 
Arizona -10.47 -7.03 183 
Arkansas -9.76 -6.32 189 
Virginia -8.20 -4.76 202 
Missouri -7.20 -3.76 213 
Florida -5.01 -1.57 240 
Colorado -4.67 -1.23 249 
Nevada -2.59 0.85 254 
Ohio -2.11 1.33 274 
New Mexico -0.79 2.65 279 
Iowa -0.67 2.77 286 
Wisconsin 0.38 3.82 296 
New Hampshire 1.37 4.81 300 
Pennsylvania 2.50 5.94 321 
Michigan 3.42 6.86 338 
Minnesota 3.48 6.92 348 
Oregon 4.16 7.60 355 
New Jersey 6.68 10.12 370 
Washington 7.17 10.61 381 
Delaware 7.59 11.03 384 
Hawaii 8.74 12.18 388 
Maine 9.00 12.44 392 
California 9.95 13.39 447 
Illinois 10.34 13.78 468 
Connecticut 10.37 13.81 475 
Maryland 12.98 16.42 485 
New York 18.29 21.73 516 
Vermont 20.14 23.58 519 
Rhode Island 20.75 24.19 523 
Massachusetts 25.16 28.60 535 
District of Columbia 79.84 83.28 538 
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270 electoral votes. Starting with the state most Democratic in partisan preference, we 
count up in electoral votes until the total reaches 270. The third column in Table 4 (above) 
demonstrates this process using the 2004 election as an example. As expected, Ohio, the 
state which generated the most controversy following the election is the state located in the 
pivotal position. And, while this result will also produce an intuitive result for the 2000 
election (with Florida occupying the pivotal position), it will be more instructive for less 
close elections where the pivotal state is less obvious.  
 This, in effect, allows us to enhance the data set by constructing a series of 
counterfactual election examples to see which states would have been decisive, like Florida 
and Ohio, had the election been close. As Rabinowitz and Macdonald explain:  
Electoral tides may make an election overwhelmingly Democratic or 
Republican, but the state in the pivotal position is always the fulcrum that 
divides the states into those which are relatively Democratic and those which 
are relatively Republican. In a sufficiently close election it is the pivotal state 
which determines the outcome. (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1986; 69) 
 
The basic assumption is that as the national popular vote shifted to make the election closer, 
the basic ordering of states by partisan preference would have been maintained. Any 
resulting tendencies in which states have occupied the pivotal position provide for the first 
analyzable result. Given a data set of nineteen elections, we can analyze the frequency with 
which large states have occupied the pivotal position and how that result compares with 
what a priori models would predict. Similarly, we can test to see if certain regions of the 
country tend to occupy the pivotal position more or less frequently than would be expected 
if there were no regional tendencies. Finally, we can look at individual states to see if there 
are anomalous results, where states occupy the pivotal position with a frequency substantially 
different than a priori models would predict.  
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The data set can be further enhanced by considering not only those states which 
have occupied the pivotal position, but also those which have been proximate to the pivotal 
position. A state, for example, may not have occupied the pivotal position since 1932, but 
may have been one spot away three times indicating a propensity to be quite important in 
deciding election outcomes. To account for these “close calls”, I will construct a table where 
states are listed according to how often they have occupied the pivotal position, how often 
they have been one spot away from the pivotal position, and so on, up to five spots away 
from the pivotal position.  
To weigh the relative importance of each of these positions, I propose an arbitrary, 
but I believe reasonable, weighting of their importance. Ten points will be assigned for 
occupying the pivotal position, six for being one away from the pivotal position, four for 
two away, three for three away, two for four away and one for five away. The summation of 
these point totals over the data set will provide an index of how likely a state is to occupy the 
pivotal position, our second analyzable result. While this index is imperfect, it does help us 
to approximate state voting power, as well as order the table such that comparably influential 
states are displayed close together.   
 A more systematic measure of proximity to pivotal status, the “competitiveness 
index”, will provide us with our third analyzable result. This “competitiveness index” will ask 
how well the state popular vote total tracked with that of the national popular vote. The 
theory is that states which track most closely with national movements in partisan sentiment 
are likely to occupy the pivotal position when it matters most—in close elections. A data set 
of nineteen election results will allow us to calculate the basic mean and standard deviation 
test statistics necessary to model each state’s partisan tendencies relative to the national 
average. These test statistics, when combined with the assumption that the data is normally 
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distributed14, allow us to calculate the probability that the state’s popular vote will be 
within1% of the national popular vote.15
Because this proximity indicates a high likelihood that the state will occupy the 
pivotal position (or a position close to the pivotal position), we can treat these probabilities 
as proportional to the probability that a state will occupy the pivotal position. These 
resulting index values will then be compared with what would be predicted under a priori 
assumptions to determine states which have unexpectedly large or small amounts of voting 
power.   
While the above indices are based upon the Shapley-Shubik notion of proximity to 
the pivotal position in a vote, there is one important difference. In their index, Shapley and 
Shubik would only assign voting power to those individuals within each state who formed a 
part of the victorious coalition, and those states within the country who also formed a part 
of the winning coalition. The process with the above indices I propose draws no distinction 
between being on the winning or losing side of the pivotal position—it is only concerned 
with proximity to the pivotal position.  
The theoretical justification for considering those within the losing coalition to have 
voting power is drawn from one of the core principles of the Banzhaf Index. With the 
Banzhaf Index, power is only leveraged when a voter occupies the decisive voting position—
i.e. the election is a tie prior to his/her vote and the direction of his/her vote determines the 
winner of the election. Given this assumption, it makes no sense to say that a voter’s 
 
14 The use of the normal distribution is justified by the Central Limit Theorem, which states that most 
distributions with thirty or more observations can be approximated using the normal distribution. While the 
nineteen elections making up the sample are short of the thirty necessary, the theorem’s underlying 
principle, that distributions tend toward the normal as sample size increases, still makes the normal 
distribution the best choice.   
15 This strategy is quite similar to that used by Gelman, King and Boscardin (1998). However, in their study 
they considered a window of 2% and looked only at the closeness of a state’s popular vote in isolation, 
instead of comparing it to the national popular vote, as I will do.  
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partisanship determines his/her leverage, as it has no impact on the partisanship of the 
greater population. Thus, while I have previously rejected the a priori assumptions of voting 
behavior inherent in the Banzhaf Index (i.e. that all voters in all states should be treated as 
being equally likely to vote for both parties), I accept the idea that a vote derives its value 
from its ability to act as a tie-breaker and not as a part of a larger winning coalition (as per 
the Shapley-Shubik Index). 
Given the list of states having occupied the pivotal position and the two indices the 
question is how they should be combined. The list of states having occupied the Shapley-
Shubik pivotal position is the best for a few reasons. First, it considers states that actually 
occupy the position of interest as opposed to merely being proximate. Second, it accounts 
for both state competitiveness and state size, while the two indices only consider 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, the two indices play a critical role. Because the data set only 
consists of nineteen elections, it is difficult to get a read on the relative importance of all fifty 
states within the Electoral College. There will be no indication of the relative importance of 
at least thirty-one states. And, without additional indices it would be impossible to 
distinguish between two states which had each occupied the pivotal position on one 
occasion.  
Within this context, the Proximity Index provides supplementary information about 
each of the nineteen elections and the Probability Index functionally seeks to expand the 
data set beyond the limitations of the nineteen observations drawing upon the underlying 
data to construct a distribution of likely election outcomes. Thus, these two indices will not 
be used as a means of primary analysis but as a means to supplement the first index when 
necessary.  
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The combination of indices will fill a large gap within the existing literature. While 
there is significant attention given to determining a priori voting power, and empirical 
determinations of how voting power changes for individual voters according to the 
population of their state, there is little empirical work on the voting power of particular 
states within the Electoral College. Filling this gap is particularly important because it is 
precisely this question—how much voting power different states have within the Electoral 
College—which is most hotly debated by the general public. Particularly in the context of 
the latest attempts to abolish the Electoral College, this research can serve to instruct states 
whether it would be in their best interest to shift to a direct popular vote.  
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Chapter 5: Results 
I. Introduction 
 
The results of the analysis are displayed in Tables 5-7. Table 5 shows the states which 
have occupied the pivotal position in the nineteen elections within the data set. The only 
anomaly contained within the table stems from the 1972 election, when both Ohio and 
Maine could be considered pivotal states. If they voted for separate candidates, both 
candidates would have had 269 electoral votes, throwing the election to the U.S. House. 
Table 5: States occupying the pivotal position* beginning in 1932. 
 
State  Number of times occupying pivotal position 
Ohio 4 
Michigan 3 
Florida 2 
Illinois 2 
Pennsylvania 2 
Iowa 1 
Maine 1 
New York 1 
Oregon 1 
Tennessee 1 
Washington 1 
Wisconsin 1 
*The pivotal position is the state which occupies the central position, once states are ordered from most 
Republican to most Democratic, such that whichever party receives that state’s votes will win. 
 
Table 6 shows the calculation of the Proximity Index, which considers not just states 
which have occupied the pivotal position but also those which were close to the pivotal 
position. The index awards ten points for each election in which the state occupies the 
pivotal position, six points for each election a state is one spot away, four points for each 
election two spots away, etc. The columns to the right of the index itself indicate the origin 
of the state’s index points—i.e. how many times the state was in the pivotal position, one 
spot away, two spots away, etc. The final two columns in the table indicate which party 
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Table 6: Calculation of the Proximity Index: the relative proximity of states to the pivotal position in 
Presidential elections since 1932. The range of scores is 0 to 190, where 0 indicates a state has never been 
within five spots of the pivotal position and 190 indicates the state has always held the pivotal position.  
 
Number of spots away from  
pivotal position 
State easily 
carried by 
(when not close 
to pivotal) 
State 
 
Proximity
Index* 
 
Number 
of times at 
pivotal 
position 1 2 3 4 5 D R
Ohio 77 4 3 2 3 0 2 0 5 
Michigan 41 3 0 0 2 2 1 6 5 
New Mexico 40 0 3 3 1 2 3 4 3 
Iowa 37 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 7 
Pennsylvania 37 2 1 0 3 0 2 7 4 
Illinois 36 2 0 1 1 4 1 6 4 
Missouri 33 0 0 6 0 4 1 7 1 
Wisconsin 33 1 1 3 1 0 2 6 5 
Oregon 30 0 2 3 0 3 0 7 4 
Connecticut 27 0 3 2 0 1 1 5 7 
Delaware 27 0 2 1 0 4 3 7 2 
Florida 27 2 0 0 2 0 1 6 8 
New Hampshire 25 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 13 
New Jersey 23 1 2 0 0 0 1 4 11 
Colorado 21 0 1 1 3 1 0 2 11 
New York 20 1 1 1 1 1 0 12 2 
Louisiana 19 0 2 1 0 1 1 9 5 
Minnesota 18 0 2 1 0 0 2 12 1 
Nevada 18 0 2 0 1 1 1 5 9 
Maine 17 1 0 0 2 0 1 6 9 
California 15 0 1 0 2 1 1 10 4 
Idaho 15 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 14 
Maryland 15 0 1 1 1 0 2 12 2 
Washington 15 1 0 0 0 1 3 12 2 
Kentucky 14 0 1 0 1 2 1 8 6 
Montana 14 0 1 1 1 0 1 5 10 
Tennessee 14 1 0 0 1 0 1 9 7 
Alaska 12 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 7 
Texas 12 0 0 1 1 2 1 6 8 
Wyoming 12 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 15 
Massachusetts 9 0 1 0 1 0 0 14 3 
Hawaii 6 0 0 1 0 1 0 9 1 
Mississippi 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 9 
South Dakota 6 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 15 
Utah 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 14 
Vermont 6 0 0 1 0 1 0 6 11 
West Virginia 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 14 4 
Virginia 4 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 11 
Arkansas 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 6 
Georgia 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 8 
Indiana 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 18 
Rhode Island 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 16 2 
Oklahoma 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 11 
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 8 
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 14 
District of Columbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 18 
North Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 9 
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 17 
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 9 
* The Proximity Index assigns states ten points for occupying the pivotal position, six points for falling one 
spot away from the pivotal position, four points for falling two spots away from the pivotal position, three 
points for falling three spots away from the pivotal position, two points for falling four spots away from the 
pivotal position, and one point for falling five spots away from the pivotal position. 
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carried the state in elections where it was not proximate to the pivotal position. This column  
 
is important because it shows whether or not these states have tended to be more  
 
Democratic or Republican. Ohio, for example, has gone Republican every time it has been  
 
more than five spots from the pivotal position. Missouri, on the other hand, has gone  
 
Democratic in seven of the eight elections it has been more than five spots from the pivotal  
 
position.  
Table 7 shows the calculation of the Probability Index, which determines the 
probability that a state election outcome will be close enough that the state has a chance to 
occupy the pivotal position. This probability is calculated using the differentials between the 
state popular vote and the national popular vote for each of the nineteen elections in the 
data set. For example, if a state goes Democrat by a margin of 5% while the national popular 
vote goes Republican by a margin of 5%, then the state would be 10% to the Democratic 
side of the national popular vote. The mean and standard deviation are the test statistics for 
the differentials calculated using these nineteen elections. A positive mean indicates a 
tendency of the state to be more Democratic and a negative mean indicates a tendency for as 
state to be more Republican16. The probability of a state lying within one percent of the 
pivotal position is then calculated by assuming that these test statistics come from a normal 
distribution.  
II. Resolving the Large-State/Small-State debate 
 
A long-running debate surrounding the Electoral College is whether large states or 
small states are advantaged. The tables provide some insight toward answering this question. 
The five states which have occupied the pivotal position on more than one occasion (Ohio, 
 
16 This is true because differentials are calculated by taking the Democratic percentage of the popular vote 
and subtracting the Republican percentage. Hence positive values indicate a Democratic leaning and 
negative values indicate a Republican leaning.  
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Table 7: Calculation of the Probability Index: the probability that a state’s popular vote will lie within one 
percent of the national popular vote.  
 
State 
Probability 
Index* 
Proximity 
Index 
 
Mean* 
Standard 
Deviation* 
New Mexico 16.24 40 -0.11 4.86 
Ohio 14.08 77 -3.37 3.95 
Michigan 12.70 41 0.31 6.32 
Missouri 12.61 33 2.19 5.94 
Illinois 12.51 36 1.14 6.22 
California 11.86 15 3.02 5.94 
Oregon 11.56 30 1.63 6.53 
Washington 10.84 15 4.48 4.46 
Pennsylvania 10.71 37 0.52 7.41 
Wisconsin 10.19 33 1.27 7.54 
Delaware 9.92 27 0.59 7.81 
Kentucky 9.88 14 -0.89 7.82 
New Jersey 9.63 23 -2.03 7.90 
Maryland 8.86 15 5.28 6.45 
Connecticut 8.70 27 -1.08 8.87 
Iowa 8.38 37 -2.69 8.91 
West Virginia 8.27 6 5.17 7.68 
Montana 7.36 14 -2.51 10.50 
New York 7.01 20 5.70 9.62 
Nevada 6.60 18 -2.60 11.12 
Tennessee 6.59 14 2.67 11.41 
Colorado 6.54 23 -6.73 5.17 
Virginia 6.33 4 -1.34 12.15 
Minnesota 6.19 18 7.48 6.50 
New Hampshire 5.29 25 -9.11 8.35 
Arizona 5.15 0 -5.36 13.12 
Maine 4.77 17 -6.21 15.36 
Florida 4.74 27 2.45 17.45 
Oklahoma 4.73 1 -6.50 15.37 
North Carolina 4.58 0 4.89 16.23 
South Dakota 4.30 6 -10.76 11.27 
Vermont 4.18 6 -8.94 18.19 
Alaska 4.17 12 -5.91 18.89 
North Dakota 4.02 0 -12.33 12.80 
Hawaii 3.98 6 11.98 10.17 
Massachusetts 3.63 9 12.27 14.54 
Utah 3.02 6 -15.94 18.33 
Rhode Island 3.01 3 14.99 12.77 
Texas 2.99 12 9.05 25.35 
Louisiana 2.90 19 11.98 27.26 
Arkansas 2.80 3 14.42 20.48 
Idaho 2.78 15 -16.74 12.93 
Wyoming 2.77 12 -15.09 10.97 
Georgia 2.39 3 17.13 30.86 
Alabama 2.23 0 7.41 32.66 
Mississippi 1.93 6 10.86 44.00 
South Carolina 1.88 0 12.71 36.90 
Nebraska 0.81 0 -20.43 9.45 
Indiana 0.40 3 -10.21 3.47 
Kansas 0.34 0 -17.38 6.48 
District of Columbia 0 0 71.72 10.69 
*Mean and standard deviation are test statistics calculated from the partisan differentials between the state 
popular vote and the national popular vote. A positive mean indicates the state tends to fall to the Democratic 
side of the national popular vote, a negative mean indicates the state tends to fall to the Republican side of the 
national popular vote. By assuming that these test statistics come from a normal distribution, we can then 
calculate the probability that a state’s partisan differential will lie less than one percent away from the national 
partisan differential.
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Michigan, Florida, Illinois and Pennsylvania) are all large states which had seventeen or more  
 
electoral votes in the 2004 election. 
 This pattern of large-state bias holds, but to a lesser extent with Tables 6 and 7, 
which display the results for the Proximity Index and the Probability Index respectively. 
While there is still an abundance of large states scoring quite highly on these indices (Ohio, 
Michigan, Illinois, and Pennsylvania especially), the top of these lists is also sprinkled with 
smaller states (New Mexico, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, etc.). I should note that this is 
partially because these indices minimize the impact of larger electoral vote totals—for 
example, while more electoral votes make it more likely that a state will occupy the pivotal 
position, these additional electoral votes have no impact on the likelihood of a state lying 
one spot away from the pivotal position. Similarly, with the Probability Index, no 
consideration is given to size—the index only considers competitiveness.  
 Despite this limitation, some important conclusions can be drawn, particularly from 
the Proximity Index. While state size can be a tremendous advantage, that size is only 
beneficial to that state if it has a tendency to be competitive. California is now the largest 
state with fifty-five electoral votes and has yet to occupy the pivotal position. This can be 
attributed to a tendency to be less competitive than other large states such as Ohio and 
Michigan, and also somewhat to bad luck (it ranks 6th on the Probability Index, indicating 
that the state’s election results don’t tend to stray too far from the national average). 
Additionally, smaller states have occupied the pivotal position on a handful of occasions—
Iowa, Maine, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin have all done so once.  
 Thus, while the combination of size and a tendency to be competitive marks those 
states which have had the most power within the Electoral College, the more important 
aspect appears to have been this tendency to be competitive. Those states which are 
48
consistently track with national swings and lie close to the pivotal position have possessed 
and will continue to possess power within the Electoral College disproportionate to their 
size. The reverse is also true—those states which have partisan leanings which push them 
away from the pivotal position will have less power than their size should grant them.  
 The remainder of my analysis, then, will focus on the tendency of certain states to 
remain competitive over a long period of time and the tendency of certain states to display 
partisan tendencies which prevent them from lying close to the pivotal position. While this 
paper is not concerned with partisan behavior of states as an end in itself, this partisan 
behavior highlights states which are more politically homogenous and, therefore, 
disadvantaged by the Electoral College.  
III. Competitiveness and Partisan Orientation 
 
An additional table, Table 8, provides an overview of the partisan paths of each state 
as well as the eras in which they were most competitive. Boxes that are blacked out indicate 
that the state occupied the pivotal position in that election year. Those boxes with numbers 
indicate how close the state came to occupying the pivotal position. Positive numbers 
indicate that the state fell to the Democratic side of the pivotal position and negative 
numbers indicate that the state fell to the Republican side of the pivotal position. Thus, an 
entry of “2” indicates the state was two spots to the Democratic side of the pivotal position, 
while an entry of “-3” indicates the state was three spots to the Republican side of the 
pivotal position. Finally, the bulk of the entries within the table are either D’s or R’s 
indicating that the state lied substantially to either the Democratic or Republican side of the 
pivotal position respectively. Both the numbers as well as the D’s and R’s are color coded  
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Table 8: Relative proximity of states to the pivotal position election-by-election beginning in 1932*.  
 
State 
 
32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88 92 96 00 04
Proximity 
Index 
AL D D D D R D D D R D R D D R R R R R R 0
AK        R D -1 -1 D R R D R R R R 12 
AZ D D D D D R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 0
AR D D D D D D D D R 3 R D D R R D D R R 3
CA 3 D D D -1 R D -5 R -3 D R R 4 D D D D D 15 
CO -3 4 D R D R R R -3 R R R R R 1 -3 R R -2 23 
CT R R 1 1 R -2 R D D D 5 R -1 R 4 2 D R D 27 
DE R R 4 5 -5 D D 2 -4 -4 1 D D -1 -5 4 D D D 27 
DC         D D D D D D D D D D D 0
FL D D D D D 3 R R R R D R R R R -5 -3 27 
GA D D D D D D D D R R R D D -3 R R R R R 3
HI        -4 D D R 2 D D D D D D D 6
ID 2 D 3 -4 1 R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 15 
IL -4 -4 R -5 4 R -3 R -2 4 R D D D D D D 36 
IN R R R R -3 R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 3
IA R R R 2 R R R -2 R D -4 -5 D D 1 3 3 2 37 
KS R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 0
KY 1 -3 D D D D D R D R R D D -5 -4 -4 R R R 14 
LA D D D D D D 2 D R D R D 5 R -1 -1 4 R R 19 
ME R R R R R R R R D D -3 D R -3 5 D D D 17 
MD D 5 D -3 R -1 R D D 5 -2 D D D D D D D D 15 
MA R R -1 3 D D R D D D D D D D D D D D D 9
MI R -5 R R R 4 4 D D D R 3 3 D D D 41 
MN D D R 2 D 1 D 1 5 D D D D D D D D 5 D 18 
MS D D D D D D D D R D R 1 R R R R R R R 6
MO D 2 -4 R D D D -2 D 2 -4 5 2 -2 D D -4 -2 -4 33 
MT 5 D D D D R 1 D R R 2 R R R 3 R R R R 14 
NE D R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 0
NV D D D D 3 R -1 D R R R R R R R -5 R -4 -1 18 
NH R R -2 -2 R R R R 3 R R R R R R R 1 -1 4 25 
NJ R -1 R R R R R D 1 -5 R R R R R D D D 23 
NM D D 5 4 D 2 -2 -1 -5 R -3 R R -4 5 D -2 1 1 40 
NY -5 -2 R -4 -3 R D D D D D D D D D D D D 20 
NC D D D D D D D D R R R D D R R R R R R 0
ND D D R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 0
OH R -5 R -2 -5 R R 1 -1 -3 1 -2 R -3 -3 77 
OK D D D D D D D R R R R -5 R R R R R R R 1
OR 4 D 2 -1 R R D R 4 R D -2 -2 D D D -1 4 D 30 
PA R R R R D 3 5 D D 3 3 1 D D D D 5 37 
RI R R D D D D -3 D D D D D D D D D D D D 3
SC D D D D D D D D R R R D D R R R R R R 0
SD D R R R R R -4 R R R D R R R 2 R R R R 6
TN D D D D D D D R R R R D D 3 R R -5 R 14 
TX D D D D D D 5 3 2 4 R 4 R R R R R R R 12 
UT -1 D D D D R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 6
VT R R R R R R R R D R R R 4 2 D D D D D 6
VA D D D D D -4 -5 R R R R R R R R R R R -5 4
WA D D D D D 5 D R D D R -4 5 D D 5 D D 15 
WV R 1 D D D D D D D D R D D D D D D R R 6
WI D D R R 5 R R R -1 -5 D D D D -2 2 2 3 33 
WY -2 3 -3 R 4 R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 12 
* Blacked out squares indicate states which occupied the pivotal position. Number within the table indicate 
how close the state was to the pivotal position (negative numbers indicate the state fell to the Republican side, 
positive numbers indicate the state fell to the Democratic side). “R” indicates that the state fell to the 
Republican side of the pivotal position but was not proximate, and “D” indicates that the state fell to the 
Democratic side of the pivotal position but was not proximate.  
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(blue for Democrat and red for Republican) to make the table easier to read. The final 
column includes the Proximity Index, which is calculated according to the method explained 
above. 
The states break down into three broad categories: those which are competitive on a 
regular basis (or at least for an extended period of time up until the present), those which are 
uncompetitive because they are Republican strongholds and those which are uncompetitive 
because they are Democratic strongholds. This broadly drawn separation of states is not very 
precise but it will be used, nevertheless, to provide a stable organization of states. Table 9 
provides a breakdown of those states by basic party affiliation. It should be noted that the 
length of the Republican list is far longer than that of the Democratic list because of the 
electoral vote distributions of the states making up those lists—the Democratic list includes 
far more states with large electoral vote totals (i.e. California, Illinois, etc.).The ordering of 
the states is done alphabetically and indicates nothing as to the relative degree of partisan 
preference. 
Within each of these divisions, particular groups of states which have exhibited 
similar electoral behavior over the course of elections will be identified. These groupings will 
highlight particular electoral characteristics of each of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia without having to devote attention to each state individually. Moreover, these 
groupings provide the basis for a better understanding of patterns of electoral preference 
throughout the country. The South (defined by many political commentators as the 
southeastern-most thirteen states), for example, does not always act as one ideological unit 
but rather as a series of smaller units, which will be discussed below. 
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Table 9: Breakdown of states by partisan tendencies. 
 
Republican Stronghold Competitive Democratic Stronghold 
Alabama Connecticut California 
Alaska Florida Delaware 
Arizona Iowa District of Columbia 
Arkansas Michigan Hawaii 
Colorado Missouri Illinois 
Georgia New Mexico Maine 
Idaho New Hampshire Maryland 
Indiana Ohio Massachusetts 
Kansas Oregon Minnesota 
Kentucky Pennsylvania New Jersey 
Louisiana Wisconsin New York 
Mississippi  Rhode Island 
Montana  Vermont 
Nebraska  Washington 
Nevada   
North Carolina   
North Dakota   
Oklahoma   
South Carolina   
South Dakota   
Tennessee   
Texas   
Utah   
Virginia   
West Virginia   
Wyoming   
IV. Republican States 
 
The following table provides an overview of four sub-groupings within the 
Republican stronghold states. These sub-groupings consider both when the state became a 
Republican stronghold as well as the degree to which it has acted as a Republican 
stronghold. Those states within the Absolute Republican Stronghold group are states which 
have been Republican strongholds since the beginning of the period under analysis. Those 
states within the “R52” group have been Republican strongholds since the 1952 election. 
52
Those states within the “South” group are Southern states (or states which have behaved 
similar to Southern states) which have been Republican strongholds beginning with the 1964 
election. Finally, Oklahoma and West Virginia are in an “Other” category because they have 
not followed a pattern similar to those of the other states. Again, states within each column 
are listed alphabetically.  
Table 10: Sub-groupings among Republican stronghold states. 
 
Absolute 
Republican 
Strongholds (ARS)
Republican 
Strongholds since 
1952 (R52) 
 
South 
 
Other 
Indiana Arizona Alabama Oklahoma 
Kansas Colorado Alaska West Virginia 
Nebraska Idaho Arizona  
North Dakota Montana Arkansas  
South Dakota Nevada Georgia  
Utah Kentucky  
Wyoming Louisiana  
Mississippi  
North Carolina  
South Carolina  
Tennessee  
Texas  
Virginia  
A. Absolute Republican Strongholds (ARS) 
 
The five states included within the Absolute Republican Stronghold (hereafter ARS) 
column are those states which have been Republican strongholds for essentially the duration 
of the data set. Two of these states, Indiana and Kansas, have fallen to the Republican side 
of the pivotal position in each of the nineteen elections considered. Nebraska has fallen to 
the Republican side of the pivotal position in eighteen straight elections (beginning in 1936) 
and North Dakota has fallen to the Republican side of the pivotal position in seventeen 
straight elections (beginning in 1940). Only South Dakota has displayed somewhat deviant 
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behavior, falling to the Democratic side of the pivotal position in 1932, 1972 (when George 
McGovern, a Senator from the state, was the Democratic presidential nominee) and 1988.  
 As a group, these states are the least competitive states in the Electoral College. 
None of them has occupied the pivotal position, and only two of the states, Indiana and 
South Dakota, have fallen within five spots of the pivotal position. This is not just a case of 
bad luck—the second index, which constructs a distribution using all nineteen election 
outcomes, shows these five states all scoring near the bottom: Kansas (0.34, 50th), Indiana 
(0.40, 49th), Nebraska (0.81, 48th), North Dakota (4.02, 34th) and South Dakota (4.30, 31st). 
Moreover, it does not appear as if any of these states is trending toward the pivotal 
position—Indiana was the closest in the 2004 election, lying 17.24% to the Republican side 
of the national popular vote.  
 The consistency with which these states have been handily carried by Republican 
candidates indicates not just a party bias, but a political homogeneity which casts doubt upon 
their ability to play a pivotal role in any presidential outcomes for decades to come. This 
problem is compounded because these five states see relatively low turnover in their 
populations as they are not popular destinations for either immigration or emigration. Thus, 
it is safe to conclude that these states have been substantially disadvantaged by the workings 
of the Electoral College, and this disadvantage will continue into the indefinite future.  
B. South 
 
The block of Southern states (and those which have behaved as Southern states, 
such as Alaska) is the most difficult to analyze. While a great deal of popular discussion of 
electoral politics treats this group of states as a single monolithic unit, distinct differences in 
behavior emerge, as shown in Table 8, such that further division will better inform 
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subsequent analysis. There are four separate groups identified within the following table 
(Table 11). “Deep South” refers to those states which have behaved as Republican 
strongholds since the 1964 election. “Moderate Deep South” states have behaved similarly 
to those states within the “Deep South”, except they have been more competitive. “R80” 
refers to those states which have behaved as Republican strongholds beginning in 1980. 
Finally, Virginia defies classification, as it is a Southern state, but made the transition to a 
Republican stronghold in 1952, twelve years before the other Southern states. 
Table 11: Sub-groupings within the Southern block of states. 
 
Deep South 
 
R80 
Moderate Deep 
South 
 
Other 
Alabama Alaska Arkansas Virginia 
Georgia Texas Kentucky  
Mississippi  Louisiana  
North Carolina  Tennessee  
South Carolina    
i. Deep South 
 
The states comprising the “Deep South” group rate just behind the “ARS” states 
mentioned above in the degree to which they are disadvantaged by the Electoral College. 
Only Georgia (in 1984) and Mississippi (in 1976) have fallen within five spots of the pivotal 
position on any occasion. Moreover, these states consistently rank near the bottom on the 
second index: South Carolina (1.88, 47th), Mississippi (1.93, 46th), Alabama (2.23, 45th), 
Georgia (2.39, 44th), North Carolina (4.58, 30th).  
Unlike the aforementioned “ARS” block, however, these states have been both 
Republican and Democratic strongholds during the period under consideration. Each of 
these states definitively switched from the Democratic to the Republican column in 1964, 
following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act by Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater’s 
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successful attempt to cement a lasting Republican majority in the South. Each of these states 
has remained in the Republican column with the exception of the 1976 and 1980 elections, 
when the presence of Jimmy Carter, who had served as Governor of Georgia, swung these 
states to the Democratic side of the pivotal position (excluding Mississippi in 1980).  
The similarity between the “Deep South” and “ARS” blocks of states is that both 
demonstrate a high degree of political homogeneity. When the states swung in their partisan 
preference, the data indicates that they did so in a violent manner. It therefore appears 
unlikely that they will make the gradual transition which would allow them to lie at or near 
the pivotal position. As with the “ARS” block of states, this means the Electoral College has 
relegated these states to practical irrelevancy and is likely to do so into the future.  
 
ii. Moderate Deep South 
 
The states constituting the “Moderate Deep South” have followed a similar political 
trajectory to those of the “Deep South” in one important respect—they switched from being 
relatively safe Democratic states to being relatively safe Republican states in 1964. However, 
they have been far more competitive than those aforementioned states. While only 
Tennessee has occupied the pivotal position, all of them have been proximate on a number 
of occasions, as indicated by the Proximity Index: Louisiana (19, 17th), Kentucky (14, 25th), 
Tennessee (14, 25th) and Arkansas (3, 39th).  
 Moreover, Kentucky and Tennessee rank especially high on Index 2: Kentucky (9.88, 
12th) and Tennessee (6.59, 21st). Louisiana and Arkansas rank substantially lower, but a closer 
examination of these data indicates that this low ranking is greatly due to the due to the 
distance of the state’s position—to the Democratic side—from the pivotal position prior to 
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1964. In recent elections, Louisiana and Arkansas have tended to lie as close or closer to the 
national popular vote than Kentucky and Tennessee.  
 All four of these states have transformed into swing states with the presence of an 
identifiably Southern candidate—both Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton either brought the 
states within a few percentage points of the national popular vote or made them into 
Democratic strongholds. The presence of Al Gore on the Democratic ticket in 2000 did not 
have this effect. It is hard to say for sure why this happened, but some possible explanations 
would be his decision to distance himself from the popular Southern incumbent, Clinton, 
and the presence of another Southern candidate on the opposing ticket in George W. Bush.  
 Thus, these states could be considered moderately more competitive than those 
composing the “Deep South” block. The election results indicate a greater degree of political 
heterogeneity which offers a greater possibility for approaching pivotal status. Nevertheless, 
these states still display a tendency to drift away from the pivotal position such that it can 
safely be stated that they are disadvantaged by the Electoral College.  
iii. R80 
 
Texas and Alaska are included within this Southern grouping although they aren’t 
traditionally considered Southern states (indeed, Alaska is geographically the least southern 
state in the Union). However, they became enduring Republican strongholds at 
approximately the same time as those states within the “Deep South” block. Both Texas and 
Alaska had been quite competitive in the two decades preceding the 1980 election. 
C. Republican Strongholds Since 1952 (R52)  
 
The seven states composing the “R52” block all made a definitive swing toward the 
Republican Party in the 1952 election. It is difficult to determine the cause of this swing, as 
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there is a lack of scholarly literature answering that question. Since that election, these states 
have functioned as Republican strongholds with only a few exceptions. These states have 
not been quite as uncompetitive as those composing the “ARS” and “Deep South” blocks, 
but do not rank particularly well on either index. Colorado ranks the highest on the 
Proximity Index (21, 15th) while Utah ranks the lowest (6, 32nd). Montana ranks the highest 
on the Probability Index (7.36, 18th) while Wyoming ranks the lowest (2.77, 43rd).  
In recent years two of these states, Nevada and Colorado, have tended to lie closer 
to the pivotal position—an indication that they may soon join the group of “Competitive” 
states. In 2004, for example, Nevada was only one spot to the Republican side of the pivotal 
position and Colorado was only two spots to the Republican side of the pivotal position.  
V. Democratic States 
 
Those states within the Democratic column are far more difficult to separate than 
those within the Republican column because they became Democratic strongholds on a 
more gradual basis while Republican strongholds were, more or less, formed by the elections 
of 1952 and 1964. Instead of breaking the states down into sub-groupings, Table 12 lists 
each state with the year in which it began to behave as a solidly Democratic state. 
Within this group of Democratic states, there are a few interesting cases to note. The 
first is the District of Columbia, which has been carried by the Democratic candidate by an 
unusually large margin in each of the elections since it was granted electoral votes in 1964. 
The District, according to both indices, ranks as the singularly least competitive member of 
the Electoral College. Nor is the District trending toward becoming more competitive—the 
2004 election marked the second furthest the District has been from the pivotal position 
since 1964. 
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Table 12: Democratic states listed by year they became Democratic strongholds.  
 
State Year 
Rhode Island 1940 
Minnesota 1944 
Massachusetts 1960 
New York 1960 
District of Columbia 1964 
Maryland 1976 
Hawaii 1980 
Vermont 1980 
Illinois 1984 
Washington 1984 
California 1988 
Delaware 1992 
Maine 1992 
New Jersey 1996 
The second state of interest within this group is Minnesota. In eighteen of the 
nineteen elections, Minnesota has fallen to the Democratic side of the pivotal position. Yet, 
Minnesota has remained remarkably competitive despite this partisan leaning. The state 
ranks above average on both the Proximity Index (18, 18th) and the Probability Index (6.19, 
24th). In this sense, then, the state is a less competitive version of Ohio—it has a tendency to 
be close despite a consistent partisan leaning.  
 Finally, there are the cases of Illinois, California and New York. These three states 
were among the most competitive states in the country before becoming Democratic 
strongholds. They score quite well on the both the Proximity Index—Illinois (36, 6th), New 
York (20, 16th), and California (15, 21st)—and the Probability Index—Illinois (12.51, 5th), 
California (11.84, 6th) and New York (7.01, 19th). Nevertheless, they have subsequently 
become strongly Democratic; in the 2004 election, California was the most competitive of 
these large Democratic states, but was still 13.39% to the Democratic side of the national 
popular vote.  
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VI. Competitive States 
 
How is it possible that thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia are all losers 
under the Electoral College? Because the remaining eleven states have been and will likely 
continue to be huge winners. The following table isolates the states which have been 
competitive on a consistent basis. Note that this does not mean that they were competitive 
states (i.e. close to the pivotal position) in every election, but more essentially that they have 
shown a tendency to drift back toward the pivotal position when they have strayed.  
Table 13: The performance of the competitive states on the two indices. 
 
State Pivotal Positions Proximity Index* Probability Index** 
Ohio 4 77 (1) 14.08 (2) 
Michigan 3 41 (2) 12.70 (3) 
New Mexico 0 40 (3) 16.24 (1) 
Iowa 1 37 (4) 8.38 (16) 
Pennsylvania 2 37 (4) 10.71 (9) 
Missouri 0 33 (7) 12.61 (4) 
Wisconsin 1 33 (7) 10.19 (10) 
Oregon 1 30 (9) 11.56 (7) 
Connecticut 0 27 (10) 8.70 (15) 
Florida 2 27 (10) 4.74 (28) 
New Hampshire 0 25 (13) 5.29 (25) 
*Score for each state on the Proximity Index with the state’s rank on the index in parentheses. The index 
measure the frequency with which the state has been close to the pivotal position.  
**Score for each state on the Probability Index with the state’s rank on the index in parentheses. The index 
measures how closely the state tracks with national partisan swings. 
A. Ohio 
 
Among these eleven competitive states, Ohio stands out as easily the most 
competitive. It has occupied the pivotal position on four occasions, ranks far above the 
other states on the Proximity Index (with a total nearly twice as high as Michigan, the closest 
state), and ranks second on the Probability Index. In this context, the truly pivotal role of 
Ohio in determining the 2004 election outcome (if Kerry had carried the state then he would 
have been elected President), is hardly surprising.  
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Despite this competitive history, Ohio has shown a tendency to fall to the 
Republican side of the pivotal position. In two of the elections examined, Ohio fell one spot 
to the Democratic side of the pivotal position, it has occupied the pivotal position four times 
and has fallen to the Republican side of the pivotal position a total of thirteen times. Few 
other states have fallen to the Republican side of the pivotal position with such regularity, 
and yet Ohio still manages to remain competitive enough that it has been within five spots 
of the pivotal position on all but five occasions.  The explanation for this behavior lies in the 
distribution of state outcomes relative to the national popular vote. Ohio’s mean outcome is 
-3.37, or 3.37% more Republican than the national popular vote with a standard deviation of 
3.95% (the smallest of any states in the data set). Thus, Ohio has displayed the most stable, 
predictable partisan behavior of any of the states within the data set. And the state appears 
to be becoming more competitive with time—it has occupied the pivotal position three 
times in the last eleven elections and has been within three spots of the pivotal position in 
ten of those elections.  
B. Michigan, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin 
 
The most identifiable group of states within the competitive states is the Midwest. 
The geographic concentration of these four states as well as Ohio has made this region a 
campaign hot-spot.  Moreover, the states share common interests on a number of issues—
particularly those related to agriculture. Michigan is the member of this group which most 
merits separate consideration, as the tremendous importance of the automobile industry 
distinguishes their electoral priorities from those of Iowa, Missouri and Wisconsin. 
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C. Florida and New Hampshire 
 
Florida and New Hampshire are grouped together despite their lack of geographical 
proximity and extreme size difference because they have shared partisan tendencies. Both 
states have been Republican strongholds for the bulk of the data set, but have been 
incredibly competitive in the last three election cycles (1996-2004). Both states have been 
within five spots of the pivotal position in all three elections and Florida famously (or 
infamously) occupied the pivotal position in 2000. Both states rank toward the middle of the 
two indices but are likely to play a crucial role in upcoming elections, justifying their 
inclusion within the “Competitive” state grouping.  
D. The Rest 
 
The remaining states (New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Oregon and Connecticut) lack the 
clear identifying characteristics of the previously listed states and, thus, are listed separately. 
These states represent great geographical diversity as well as varying performances on both 
the Proximity and Probability indices. New Mexico performs quite well on both indices—
ranking first on the Probability Index, and third on the Proximity Index—despite never 
having occupied the pivotal position. This case most clearly shows the utility of the indices 
by uncovering a state which is often overlooked in popular discussion and does not show up 
as having occupied the pivotal position.  
 Pennsylvania occupied the pivotal position in 1996, and also ranks quite well on both 
the Proximity Index (37, 4th) and the Probability Index (10.71, 9th). Oregon and Connecticut 
do not perform quite as strongly on the two indices, and both fell to Democratic side of the 
pivotal position in the 2004 election. Nevertheless, both states have sufficiently competitive 
histories that one would expect them to be close to the pivotal position in the near future.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
In this paper, I have developed new empirical measures of voting power which I 
believe provide a more accurate understanding of biases present in the Electoral College. 
These indices focus on the importance of occupying the pivotal position. Once states are 
ordered from most Republican to most Democratic, the pivotal state is that which occupies 
the central position, such that whichever party receives their votes will emerge victorious. 
The Proximity Index considers states which have occupied the pivotal position, or been 
close to occupying the pivotal position. The Probability Index examines how closely a state’s 
popular vote tracks with the national popular vote—those states which track closely will be 
more likely to occupy the pivotal position.  
 These indices represent an improvement upon previous measures of voting power 
for three reasons. First, traditional a priori measures require unrealistic assumptions about the 
behavior of voters by ignoring known partisan tendencies of voters in particular states. The 
new empirical measures, however, do draw upon concepts developed as part of these a priori 
measures. In particular, I focus on the importance of states occupying the pivotal position, a 
concept central to the Shapley-Shubik Index. Second, these indices represent an 
improvement upon previous empirical measures of voting power by simplifying the 
calculation to only consider partisan orientation of a state, potentially distracting information 
is omitted. Finally, these indices represent an improvement upon previous measures of 
voting power because they are dynamic, allowing for changes in the partisan tendencies of 
states over time.  
Applying these new voting power indices to Presidential election data from 1932 to 
present provides partial confirmation of the findings of a priori measures—large states do 
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appear to be advantaged by the Electoral College. However, these indices reveal a significant 
qualification to this bias: states must be politically heterogeneous in order to exercise this 
additional leverage. Large states (such as New York, California and Illinois in recent 
elections) which are carried by one party by a large margin and on a consistent basis, possess 
less voting power than small states where the two parties are more competitive (such as 
Iowa, New Mexico, Missouri and Wisconsin). Moreover, this finding corresponds closely to 
what we observe on the campaign trail, where “swing states” receive the bulk of the 
attention from Presidential candidates.  
A second, more unexpected finding, was that the process of ordering states 
according to partisan tendency revealed electoral tendencies and trends which could inform 
Presidential campaign strategy in upcoming elections. In Chapter 5, the most competitive 
eleven states were identified, as well as other states which could become competitive states 
in the near future (such as Colorado, Nevada, Louisiana and Arkansas).  
This research raises some interesting questions as well. First, it would be instructive 
to know the impact of the assigned weights on the Proximity Index. What would happen if 
the index placed more importance on occupying the pivotal position itself? What if the index 
further de-emphasized occupying the pivotal position relative to proximal positions. Second, 
findings of bias could be more conclusive if more elections were considered. If the data set 
was expanded beyond elections since 1932, would the findings be different?  This additional 
analysis would tell us more about both the large-state versus small-state debate as well as 
whether advantages enjoyed by particular states in recent elections have been persistent 
throughout the history of the Presidency.  
Despite these questions, this analysis has much to offer in the context of renewed 
debate over the Electoral College, as states around the country argue the merits of an 
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interstate compact which would effectively abolish the Electoral College. For some states, of 
course, it’s quite clear how the Electoral College affects them; it doesn’t take an analysis of 
voting power to know that Ohio and Florida are advantaged by the Electoral College, while 
Indiana and Kansas are disadvantaged. The analysis of voting power, however, does help 
separate the relative influence of states not so clearly advantaged or disadvantaged.  
Accordingly, this analysis of voting power has two uses. First, it can potentially 
inform citizens and state legislatures what course of action would be in their best interest. 
States, such as Connecticut and Oregon, which are not commonly recognized as states 
advantaged by the Electoral College but perform quite well on both the Probability and 
Proximity indices, could find this analysis of tremendous use. 
Second, this analysis offers predictive insight as to how likely different states are to 
agree to the proposed interstate compact. We would intuitively expect that those states most 
disadvantaged by the Electoral College would be more likely to join the compact and those 
most advantaged by the Electoral College would be less likely to join the compact. The 
party-line votes in the California legislature indicate that partisan concerns will also play a 
part in determining which states choose to adopt the compact. While it’s tough to tell if the 
compact will eventually enter into force, the two indices suggest most states would emerge 
winners under the compact and a select few states (i.e. the eleven “Competitive” states, as 
identified in Chapter 5) would emerge as big losers.  
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